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CIVIL PROCEDURE: ACCESS TO THE DISTRICT COURTS,
SUITABILITY OF THE FORUM, AND APPELLATE
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
JEFFREY M. GALLAGHER*
From the many cases involving civil procedure decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit during the past
year,' this article selects for discussion those which relate to three basic
aspects of the federal court system: the access to the federal district
court enjoyed by willing litigants; the suitability of the forum to the
particular litigation; and the access to appellate review. Civil proce-
dure cases decided by the Seventh Circuit this year but not discussed in
the text are noted by subject throughout the article.2
ACCESS TO THE DISTRICT COURT: SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
There were several cases during the 1978-79 term in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit supervised the
access of litigants to the district courts through the principles of subject
matter jurisdiction, including diversity, federal question, amount in
controversy, pendent jurisdiction, and removal. The Seventh Circuit
work in balancing relations between federal and state courts through
the development and application of the abstention doctrine will also be
discussed.
Diversity Jurisdiction
In Betar v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd ,3 the Seventh Cir-
cuit sharpened a tool for paring cases out of federal jurisdiction, en
route to creating what appears to be a new rule for determining
whether diversity of citizenship exists in a wrongful death action
brought by a court-appointed administrator. Plaintiff, an Illinois resi-
dent who was the court-appointed administrator of the estate of a na-
tive of India, brought a wrongful death action in an Illinois court
* Associate, Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison, Wisconsin; J.D., University
of Wisconsin; A.B., Harvard University.
1. This article discusses cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit between June 1978 and August 1979.
2. Many decisions made during the year cannot be discussed, but are set forth by subject in
note 179 infra.
3. 603 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1979).
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against the Canadian manufacturer of the airplane in which the dece-
dent was killed.
The action was removed to the federal district court on the basis of
diversity of citizenship between the Illinois administrator and the Ca-
nadian defendant corporation, and the district court dismissed the ac-
tion for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed, urging that the
district court lacked jurisdiction. Plaintiff argued that diversity should
be determined with regard to the citizenship not of the administrator,
but of the beneficiaries of the action under the Illinois Wrongful Death
Act.4 Since the beneficiaries were all natives of India, diversity juris-
diction would not exist because the suit would be between aliens.
Thus, removal would be improper and the cause would have to be re-
manded to the state court, rather than dismissed.
The Seventh Circuit in Betar acknowledged the general rule that
the citizenship of the real party in interest determines diversity jurisdic-
tion, 5 and agreed that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides
that only the administrator may properly bring the action in federal
court. However, the court stated that rule 17(a) was merely "procedu-
ral," and that the determination of subject matter jurisdiction requires
instead a "substantive" analysis.6 Here, the analysis was based on 28
U.S.C. § 1359, 7 the statutory proscription against collusively invoked
jurisdiction. The court referred to a large number of cases where
courts, under the authority of section 1359, disregarded a representative
party and considered instead the actual beneficiary in order to defeat
diversity jurisdiction. In most of these cases, the representative was ap-
pointed by the beneficiary rather than by the court, and was appointed
for the specific purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction. In Betar,
however, the court found that there was a "most conspicuous. . . lack
of an apparent motive to manufacture jurisdiction."'8
This lack of intent to manufacture jurisdiction forced the Seventh
Circuit to refashion the rule for applying section 1359. No longer is
intent to manufacture jurisdiction indispensible; 9 instead, the Seventh
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 69 (1977).
5. 603 F.2d at 32, citing C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, 6 FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1556 at 711 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as WRIGHT & MILLER].
6. Id
7. The statute provides:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assign-
ment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the
jurisdiction of such court.
28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1978).




Circuit stated that "[tihe purpose of section 1359 is to limit considera-
tion to cases that 'really and substantially' involve a dispute within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts."' 0 The court decided that this case
did not come within diversity jurisdiction because the named plaintiff
had no vested interest in the action. The interested parties were all
aliens and an action between aliens is not within the diversity jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts. Nor would the purpose of diversity jurisdic-
tion, which is to prevent local prejudice, be served in such an action
between aliens."I Therefore, since plaintiff originally could not have
brought the action in federal court, removal was improper, and the case
was remanded to the state court.
Besides offering a new, broader interpretation of section 1359, the
Betar decision has the apparent effect, at least to the cautious litigator,
of establishing the rule that when suit is brought by a court-appointed
representative the court will consider both his citizenship and that of
the beneficiaries to determine whether diversity jurisdiction exists.
Federal Question Jurisdiction
In two cases during the 1978-79 term, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied well-developed principles of
federal question jurisdiction. In the first, American Invs-Co. Country-
side, Inc. v. Riverdale Bank, 12 the court upheld the district court's find-
ing of subject matter jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action to
remove a cloud on title, albeit for apparently internally inconsistent
reasons. The plaintiff American Invs-Co. and others had created a real
estate land trust under Illinois law and agreed that transfers of interest
thereunder would be subject to certain Federal Housing Administra-
tion' 3 regulations. Defendant Riverdale Bank was transferred an inter-
est in the trust by one of the other participants, without either
10. Id.
I1. Id
12. 596 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979). Other cases involving federal question jurisdiction in-
cluded: Koehring Co. v. Adams, 605 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1979) (ripeness of declaratory judgment
action that agency definition conflicts with authorizing statutes); Clark v. United States, 596 F.2d
252 (7th Cir. 1979) (limits placed on federal question jurisdiction by exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims under the Tucker Act); Blocksom & Co. v. Marshall, 582 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.
1978) (appeal from administrative proceedings premature); Vishnevsky v. United States, 581 F.2d
1249 (7th Cir. 1978) (mandamus jurisdiction in action to pay back overtaxes under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1976)); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 579 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1978) (exhaustion required
before review allowed from order of administrative law judge denying motion to preclude discov-
ery in agency proceedings).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1701c(a) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as FHA]. See also 24 C.F.R.
207.9, 207.18, 221.529 (1979).
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compliance with the regulations or the consent of American Invs-Co.,
which then brought suit to declare the bank's interest void.
The district court held that American Invs-Co. failed to demon-
strate that a construction of the FHA regulatory agreement was "basic
and necessary to a decision of the case" because American Invs-Co.
might prevail on the state law theories alone. The Seventh Circuit dis-
agreed with this analysis of the jurisdictional issue because it relied on
a forecast of matters which might be dispositive at trial, rather than on
the four corners of the complaint, as required by the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule. 14 Under that rule, this bill to remove cloud on title was
drafted in a manner requiring a determination of the meaning and ef-
fect of the FHA regulatory agreement. Plaintiff alleged the facts show-
ing his title, the existence of the instrument sought to be eliminated as a
cloud, its invalidity and the legal and factual basis of its invalidity.
However, the Seventh Circuit held that while it was necessary to
this action to interpret the FHA regulatory agreement, doing so did not
involve federal law and thus there was no federal basis for jurisdiction.
Interpretation of the FHA regulatory agreement would not require re-
sort to federal common law, as plaintiff urged. Nor does any distinct
federal policy or any demonstrable congressional intent call for the
courts to fashion such federal law. Even if the FHA would be bound
by the outcome of this litigation, the federal interest is speculative and
remote, while the state's interest is strong and thus the court held that
there is no federal basis for jurisdiction.
In Local Division 519, Amalgamated Transit Union v. LaCrosse
Municipal Transit Utility,' 5 a union sued the employer for specific per-
formance of the interest arbitration provision of their contract for work
on a project receiving Urban Mass Transportation Act' 6 funds. That
arbitration provision was required by UMTA to be in the contract as a
condition of receiving the project. The Seventh Circuit easily found
that federal law was a source of an essential element of the action on
the contract and that there was a need for uniformity of decisions; thus,
a federal question was presented and jurisdiction existed under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
14. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681 (1946).
15. 585 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978).




The court appears to have adopted the "either viewpoint"'17 rule
for determining whether the amount in controversy jurisdictional re-
quirement is met in a removed diversity action for an injunction. In
McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Company,'8 McCarty brought an action in
state court for an injunction requiring Amoco to remove a pipeline
from his property and prohibiting Amoco from further pipeline opera-
tions thereon. The pipeline had been constructed on an easement
which had been condemned and deeded to Amoco in an earlier state
court action, pursuant to which McCarty was awarded compensation in
the amount of the appraised value of the easement, $1,625.
Amoco removed McCarty's action to federal district court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction and pleaded the defense of res judicata.
McCarty filed a motion to remand, disputing that the $10,000 amount
in controversy requirement' 9 was satisfied. He argued that the value of
the matter in controversy (ie., the injunction), was its benefit to him,
that this benefit was the value of the easement and that in the earlier
proceeding this had been found to be $1,625. Amoco urged that the
value of the injunction to itself was far greater than the jurisdictional
amount and filed uncontroverted affidavits showing that the cost of re-
moving the pipeline, as well as the value to Amoco's business of not
removing it, exceeded $10,000. In affirming the district court's assump-
tion of jurisdiction, reliance was apparently placed on the first of the
values shown by the defendant. "[T]he pecuniary result to [the defend-
ant] which the judgment prayed for would directly generate would ex-
ceed the jurisdictional amount. ' 20 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
the jurisdictional amount requirement is designed to measure the sub-
stantiality of the suit, and that "either viewpoint" accurately measures
the substantiality of an injunction.
The plaintiff's viewpoint, however, remains the rule for determin-
ing the value of an injunction in many cases. McCarty expressly lim-
ited the "either viewpoint" rule to removed diversity cases. 2' While
disregarding as dicta a preference for the plaintiff's viewpoint rule ex-
pressed in an earlier case,22 the court stated that "at least in civil rights
17. See, e.g., Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Govern-
ment Employees Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1964); Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R.
Co., 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940).
18. 595 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1979).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
20. 595 F.2d at 395.
21. Id
22. Id, citing City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1976).
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suits against federal officers" 23 the plaintiffs viewpoint rule may be
preferable. Furthermore, the court earlier used the plaintiffs viewpoint
rule in Local Division 519, Amalgamated Transit Union v. LaCrosse Mu-
nicipal Transit Utility.24 The district court's assumption of diversity ju-
risdiction was affirmed in this suit by a union local to force an
employer into interest arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement. In such a case, the Seventh Circuit found that "the jurisdic-
tional amount is to be measured by the value to the complainant of the
right which it seeks to protect. ' 25 By finding that the union local itself
had an interest in a new collective bargaining contract which existed
independently of its members' interests, and which alone was greater
than the jurisdictional amount, the issue of whether the jurisdictional
amount requirement could be satisfied by aggregating individual mem-
bers' claims was avoided. Also avoided was the task of searching
through the individual claims, as the district court did, to find those
exceeding the jurisdictional amount.
Pendent Jurisdiction
In at least three cases, 26 the district court's power and discretion to
hear state claims pendent to federal claims was discussed. In National
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,27 plaintiff brought a wrongful levy
action based on a federal statute against the United States and brought
claims based on state law against several private defendants. The dis-
trict court entered summary judgment for the United States and dis-
missed the state claims against the other defendants for want of
jurisdiction. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the district
court properly exercised its discretion and held that where, as here,
there never was a federal claim against the remaining defendants, the
district court would not have the power to accept jurisdiction unless it
was clear from the federal law at issue that a wide grant of jurisdiction
was intended.28
In O'Brien v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. ,29 pen-
23. 595 F.2d at 395, citing 546 F.2d at 702.
24. 585 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978).
25. Id at 1349.
26. O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1978); National
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 589 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1978); Vickers v. Quern, 578 F.2d 685
(7th Cir. 1978).
27. 589 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1978). Cf. Nemekov v. O'Hare Chicago Corp., 592 F.2d 351, 353
n. 1 (7th Cir. 1979) (dismissal of state claims proper where federal claims dismissed at outset).
28. 589 F.2d at 1304-05.
29. 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979).
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sion fund trustees brought an action for violation of federal securities
laws and state common law against a bank which handled some of the
fund's investments. Several years into the litigation, the district court
dismissed the federal claims. Thereafter, the district court dismissed
the pendent state claims not for lack of power, but in its discretion and
in the interests of comity and justice, since in the district court's judg-
ment the state law claims were important and novel. This decision was
reversed because the Seventh Circuit concluded that the state law
claims would be barred in state court by the statute of limitations.
Since the plaintiffs had pursued the action diligently, dismissal was an
abuse of discretion because it would result in the loss of any forum for
the plaintiffs.
In Vickers v. Quern,30 the district court's exercise of jurisdiction
over a pendent state claim was upheld. Plaintiff brought five claims
against the defendant state officials; three were based on federal stat-
utes, one on the federal Constitution and one on a state statute. In
considering an early motion to dismiss, the district court held that the
constitutional claim was not insubstantial. The district court subse-
quently granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the state law
claim and one federal statutory claim, and declined to decide the other
three claims. The defendants argued that exercising jurisdiction over
the state claim was an abuse of discretion because the federal constitu-
tional question was not effectively in the case and because the state
claim predominated over the federal statutory claim. The Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected this argument since the federal constitutional claim,
though properly not decided, was still material to the exercise of juris-
diction and pervaded the entire statutory scheme at issue, and since the
state claim did not predominate over the constitutional claim.
In U.S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet,31 the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over a per-
missive counterclaim to a federal cause of action. The counterclaim
alleged that the complaint constituted malicious prosecution under
state law. Jurisdiction over the state claim was not found to exist be-
cause the state claim did not arise out of a common nucleus of fact with
the federal claim. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found that even if a
common nucleus of fact did exist, jurisdiction would be a matter of
discretion for the district court and it would not be an abuse of discre-
30. 578 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1978).
31. 598 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1979).
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tion to dismiss a permissive counterclaim which adds several new par-
ties to the action and has no other basis of jurisdiction.
These cases evidence significant evolution in the court's view of
whether a district court should dismiss pendent state claims when the
contemporary federal claims are dismissed before trial. In Vickers, the
court noted that: "Gibbs stated that if the federal claims are dismissed
before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well, ' ' 32 but also
that "[t]his doctrine has not been rigidly followed since Gibbs. '33 In
National Bank & Trust34 the court approved the district court's dismis-
sal of the state claims after the federal claims had been dismissed. Fi-
nally, in O'Brien, 35 the court stated that so long as the dismissed federal
claim was not "insubstantial," jurisdiction exists and the district court
may exercise that jurisdiction in its discretion. 36
Thus, federal jurisdiction over pendent state claims exists, even if
the federal claim is dismissed before trial, when the federal claim "is
not insubstantial. ' 37 Under this test, "if there is any foundation of
plausibility to the claim federal jurisdiction exists."' 38 However, if the
state claim involves parties who are not involved in the federal claims,
jurisdiction depends on the breadth of the particular federal claim in-
volved 39 and the context in which the state claim is asserted.40 Whether
to exercise that jurisdiction remains a matter within the discretion of
the district court, which is bound to consider judicial economy, conven-
ience, and fairness to the litigants.4' The district court's decision can-
not be set aside unless the reviewing court "has a definite and firm
conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in
the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors."'42
Removal
In the one removal case of note during the 1978-79 term, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that in certain circumstances a state administrative
32. 578 F.2d at 689 (footnote omitted), citing United Mines Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966).
33. 578 F.2d at 689 n.9.
34. 589 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1978).
35. 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979).
36. Id at 63-64.
37. Id at 63; see also 578 F.2d at 688 n.7.
38. 593 F.2d at 63, citing 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, at § 3564 (1975).
39. National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 589 F.2d 1298, 1305 (7th Cir. 1978).
40. U.S. Gen., Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1979).
41. See Vickers v. Quern, 578 F.2d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 1978), citing United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
42. O'Brien v. Continental 111. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 63 n.15 (7th Cir. 1978),
quoting In. re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954).
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agency can be a "state court" under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) 43 so that re-
moval of an action pending therein to federal district court may be ap-
propriate.44 In Floeter v. C W Transport, Inc. 5 defendants petitioned
to remove an action seeking to enforce a collective bargaining agree-
ment from the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.46 The
court performed an avowedly functional47 case-by-case analysis and al-
lowed removal. In so doing, the court found that the action might have
been brought originally in either state or federal court as well as before
the WERC, the latter merely providing a more efficient way to adjudi-
cate such claims. The Seventh Circuit further found that WERC pro-
ceedings are essentially judicial, notwithstanding the fact that the
WERC cannot enforce its own orders, but must rely on the courts for
enforcement.
Abstention
The full gamut of abstention theories was reviewed by the court of
appeals during the year,48 and a preference for the district court assum-
ing jurisdiction rather than abstaining was apparent.49 In two of the
43. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
[Any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where
such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976).
44. The court expressly left open this question several years ago, Local 139, Int'l Union of
Operating Engr's v. Carl A. Morse, Inc., 529 F.2d 574, 577 n.l (7th Cir. 1976).
45. 597 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1979).
46. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission [hereinafter referred to as the
WERC] is authorized to adjudicate certain actions by Wis. STAT. § 111.07 (1977). See Layton
School of Art & Design v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 324, 364-67, 262
N.W.2d 218, 237-38 (1977).
47. 597 F.2d at 1102.
48. The court considered abstention in three cases not discussed in the text. In two of these,
abstention under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) was at issue. In Hines v. Elkhart
Gen. Hosp., 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit held that it was proper for the
district court to abstain from deciding a state constitutional challenge to a state statute when the
precise issues in that challenge were pending before the state supreme court and the statute was of
obvious public importance. In Local Div. 519, Amalgamated Transit Union v. LaCrosse Mun.
Transit Utility, 585 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978), the Seventh Circuit held that the district court
properly declined to abstain in an action by a local union against a municipal employer seeking to
enforce the contractual rights guaranteed the union by federal statute. Finally, in Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Old Security Life Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 671
(7th Cir. 1979), the court affirmed the district court's refusal to abstain from deciding a federal
action containing claims over which the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction because of an
injunction issued in a prior state insolvency proceeding prohibiting subsequent suits. The Seventh
Circuit noted that even in the absence of exclusive federal jurisdiction, abstention would be im-
proper so long as the federal proceeding was in personam rather than in rem.
49. For example, in Local Div. 519, Amalgamated Transit Union v. LaCrosse Mun. Transit
Utility, 585 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978), the Seventh Circuit stated:
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cases discussed below, 50 the court upheld the district court's decision
not to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. In the third, 5' which in-
volved a most unusual fact setting, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision to stay the action pending full resolution of a
parallel state proceeding.
In Citizens Energy Coalition v. Sendak,52 plaintiffs' proposed con-
tracts with the state for federal funds were repeatedly disapproved by
the state attorney general on the grounds that plaintiffs were prohibited
by state law from receiving such contracts with the state because they
had a lobbyist. Plaintiffs brought action in federal court for injunctive
relief and a declaration that the attorney general's actions wrongly in-
terpreted state law and violated federal statutes and the Constitution.
The district court declined defendant's motion to abstain, found the
state statute was violated, and enjoined the attorney general from dis-
approving the contracts under the state statute.53 The attorney general
argued on appeal that the district court should have abstained because
the case involved difficult questions of state law bearing on substantial
problems of public policy. However, the Seventh Circuit found that
the district court properly exercised its discretion by refusing to abstain
because the state statute was neither difficult nor complicated. The
court further suggested that where there is a federal basis for jurisdic-
tion rather than diversity, a greater justification to abstain might well
be required of the district court. 54
In Wynn v. Carey,55 the State of Illinois appealed from an order of
the district court which found part of the Illinois Abortion Parental
Consent Act 56 unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. The state
We begin with the rule that "[tihe doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court
may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary
an narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly
before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine
only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state
court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest."
Id at 1350, quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959), as
citedin Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
50. Citizens Energy Coalition v. Sendak, 594 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1979); Wynn v. Carey, 582
F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978).
51. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., No. 78-2638 (7th Cir. June 27, 1979).
52. 594 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1979).
53. Id. at 1162-63.
54. Id at 1162, quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 815 n.21 (1976). This suggestion is troublesome because the raison d'tre of diversity jurisdic-
tion is to allow the federal courts to decide questions of state law. It therefore would seem that a
greater justification would be required to abstain when the district court sits with diversity, rather
than federal question, jurisdiction.
55. 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978).
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-151 (1978 Supp.).
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argued that the district court abused its discretion by failing to abstain
on the grounds outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Rail-
road Commission v. Pullman57 or Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 58 The state
urged that the act was unclear and had never been construed by state
courts, but that the state courts might construe it so as to eliminate or
materially change the federal constitutional issue involved.
The Seventh Circuit held, however, that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in balancing the advantages and disadvantages of
abstention, comity and the individual rights at issue. While part of the
act was arguably unclear, the court found that most of the act, includ-
ing its most objectionable part, was perfectly clear. Moreover, the Sev-
enth Circuit determined that the unclear parts of the act were of such a
nature that they could not be made sufficiently more clear by the deci-
sion of a single case; thus, abstention for a short period of time would
be fruitless. Furthermore, repeated litigation would be necessary be-
cause there was no applicable state statute for certifying questions to
the state court. Plaintiffs' pregnancy-related rights were such that they
would suffer irreversible harm if the district court abstained until there
was a sufficient case-by-case development of the state law. Finally, the
court found that the case did not involve a traditional state interest,
state expertise or special need for a coherent state policy. 59
The third case involving abstention is Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v.
American Mutual Reinsurance Co.,60 which makes a major contribution
to the development of a fourth ground for abstention: the wise judicial
administration of the federal courts.61 In announcing this fourth
ground for abstention, the Seventh Circuit stated:
There are . . . situations where a federal court may defer to a
parallel state proceeding, even when the result will be to relegate de-
cision of questions of federal law over which the district court hasjurisdiction to a state forum. The reason for such deferral is to pre-
vent duplication of judicial effort in two separate court systems and
to confine the litigation to the forum able to make the most compre-
hensive disposition ....
In making this [carefully considered] judgment, the district
57. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
58. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
59. 582 F.2d at 1383.
60. 600 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1979). American Mutual Reinsurance Company hereafter is re-
ferred to as Amreco.
61. This is a rarely invoked ground for abstention. See generally 17 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 5, at § 4247. The Calvert cases rendered unclear the status of some of the prior law of
the Seventh Circuit, including Aetna State Bank v. Althemeir, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970). See
600 F.2d at 1231 n.6. Apparently, Aetna would give to the district court a greater freedom to
abstain than would Colorado River or Calvert.
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judge may take into account such factors as (1) the desirability of
avoiding piecemeal litigation, (2) the order in which jurisdiction was
obtained by the concurrent forums, (3) the inconvenience of the fed-
eral forum, and (4) the court first assuming jurisdiction over any
property which may be involved in the suit.6 2
The series of Calvert cases63 began when Amreco brought an ac-
tion in state court seeking a declaration that a contract in which Calvert
had agreed to purchase participatory shares in a reinsurance pool oper-
ated by Amreco was in full force and effect. Calvert raised the affirma-
tive defense that the participatory shares were a "security" within the
meaning of state and federal securities laws and that Amreco failed to
comply with those laws and defrauded Calvert in violation of those
laws. Calvert asked for rescission of the contract. In addition, Calvert
counterclaimed for damages based on both common law fraud and
state statutes, but not on the federal securities laws. On the same day
that Calvert answered and counterclaimed in state court, it also filed an
action in federal district court for rescission and damages based on the
same grounds pleaded in the state action. In addition, Calvert brought
an action for damages under the Securities and Exchange Act of 193464
over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. The state
court ruled that the participatory interests were not "securities."
Thereafter, the district court stayed all its proceedings. It was essen-
tially this stay which was on review several years later in the present
case.
The Seventh Circuit in Calvert found that the district court's stay
was a proper exercise of its discretion on grounds set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States.65 Several facts in Calvert critical to the court's
decision had become clear during the years of litigation. While Calvert
once had a claim for which federal jurisdiction was exclusive, it had
none at the time of this appeal because Calvert had dropped its claim
for damages under the 1934 Act. Thus, the district court was no longer
under the "virtually unflagging obligation" 66 to retain and exercise ju-
risdiction which was present with a claim under exclusive federal juris-
62. 600 F.2d at 1233-34.
63. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 586 F.2d
12 (7th Cir. 1978); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977); Calvert Fire Ins. Co.
v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
64. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the
1934 Act].
65. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
66. See, e.g., Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Old
Security Life Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1979).
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diction. Nor was Calvert making a claim for affirmative relief under
the federal statutes in the state suit.
The Seventh Circuit noted that the state court's decision that there
was no "security" in effect adjudicated all the federal claims. The dis-
trict court had stayed, not dismissed, the federal action only after the
state court had already rendered its decision. Thus, the court of ap-
peals concluded, it was the state court's actions, not the district court's
decision to stay, which caused the state court's decision to be rendered
first and thus to allow the operation of res judicata on Calvert's action
in federal court.67 Possibly the most important aspect of the case was
the district court's finding of fact that Calvert's pursuit of the federal
action had been merely vexatious. The Seventh Circuit held that in
such a situation staying the action was entirely appropriate.
PARTIES
Access to the federal courts is generally considered to be limited to
persons with certain protected interests and to others who have a spe-
cial relationship to such persons, interests or the cause of action. The
following discussion and notes include cases decided by the Seventh
Circuit in 1978-79 involving joinder of parties, intervention, standing,68
and class actions.
Joinder
In Hansen v. Peoples Bank,69 the Seventh Circuit addressed the
problem embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 70 between
67. This issue of resjudicata threatens to extend the epic even further. See 600 F.2d at 1236
n.18.
68. The standing of an association to sue on behalf of its members was discussed in Chicago-
Midwest Meat Ass'n v. City of Evanston, 589 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff, an associa-
tion of persons, firms, and corporations engaged in processing meat, whose members were subject
to ordinances of the defendant city, brought an action to declare the ordinances invalid due to the
pre-emption by federal statutes and regulations and because the ordinances were an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit rejected defendant's challenge to the
standing of the association to sue on behalf of its members, since: (1) its members would have
standing to sue individually; (2) the interests it sought to protect were germane to the association's
purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor the relief required the participation in the lawsuit of the
individual members. Id at 280, citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333, 343 (1977).
69. 594 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1979).
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 states, in pertinent part:
Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot
be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
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retaining federal jurisdiction over an action having less than all the
interested parties or dismissing the action to the state court.7' Plaintiff
in Hansen was a California resident and an income beneficiary of a
trust. She sued the Illinois trustee in an attempt to force the appoint-
ment of the corpus of the trust to her. Defendant trustee moved that
plaintiffs children, also California residents and income beneficiaries
of the trust, be joined as party defendants. The district court, in the
exercise of its discretion, granted the motion and dismissed for lack of
diversity jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court in Hansen
found that under rule 19(a) the children's interests related to the action
in such a way that they would be impaired or their protection would be
impeded by the children's absence from the action. The court of ap-
peals further found, without choosing between the two standards, 72 that
the children were properly aligned as defendants since both their legal
interests and their actual conduct appeared to oppose the plaintiff.
Thus, the court in Hansen concluded that joinder of the children was
not feasible since joinder would destroy diversity jurisdiction.
The Seventh Circuit then considered rule 19(b). The court began
by noting that rule 19(b) provides that when such persons cannot be
joined, the action should only be dismissed if the court determines, in
equity and good conscience, that it cannot proceed without the absent
persons. 73 The Seventh Circuit took great care to ascertain that an Illi-
nois court could obtain personal jurisdiction over the children as bene-
ficiaries of the Illinois trust, and was therefore a viable alternative
forum for the entire action. Apparently, the existence of an alternative
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person. . .cannot be
made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the ac-
tion should proceed among the parties regarded as indispensable. The factors to be con-
sidered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's
absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which,
by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if
the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
71. For a discussion of two cases involving FED. R. Civ. P. 19 decided by the Seventh Circuit
last year where jurisdiction was retained by the district court, see McAllister & Howlett, Civil
Procedure- Analysis of 1977-78 Seventh Circuit Opinions Addressing Attorney- Client Relationship,
Class Action Problems, Magistrates' Jurisdiction, Statute of Limitations & Indispensable Parties, 55
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 51, 66-70 (1979).
72. There is an active dispute over which standard is appropriate. See 594 F.2d at 1154,
citing Green v. Green, 218 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955).
73. 594 F.2d at 1151. For the text of rule 19(b), see note 70 supra.
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forum was a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for dismis-
sal.74 Next, the court determined that the children's interests were im-
portant, not remote, 75 and that their interests were not identical to those
of either party already before the court, in order to avoid dismissal in
the usual manner where there is an identity of interest. Finally, the
court determined, as it is required to do under rule 19,76 that judicial
relief could not be shaped to overcome the inadequacy of representa-
tion of interests.
In Dushane v. Con/isk,77 the Seventh Circuit held that the district
court could use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 post-judgment to
make a person a party to the action for the purpose of effectuating the
relief awarded by the judgment.78 In Dushane, plaintiff was a police
officer who had been suspended from the force, but who had prevailed
in a federal action declaring the suspension illegal and ordering his
reinstatement on the same terms he enjoyed before suspension. The
defendant police department, however, subsequently failed to award
the plaintiff a promotion he would have had but for the suspension.
The department explained that by law it could make such promotions
only from the current list of candidates provided by the Civil Service
Commission and that at the time it failed to award the plaintiff a pro-
motion, the current list did not contain the plaintiffs name. The court
held that the Civil Service Commission could be added as a party
under rule 21 and would be subject to the power of the court for the
purpose of effectuating the relief awarded in the original action. 79
Intervention
In one of the several cases 80 which presented an intervention issue,
74. Bonnet v. Trustees of Schools of Twp. 41 North, 563 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Bio-Ana-
lytical Services, Inc. v. Edgewater Hosp., Inc., 565 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
820 (1978).
75. The court noted that "Ir]ule 19 is concerned with practical impairment of valuable rights,
and not formalistic labels." 594 F.2d at 1153 n.5.
76. Id. at 1151.
77. 583 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1978).
78. Id. at 967.
79. The court stated that the district court would have power to enforce orders against the
Civil Service Commission under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976). 583 F.2d at 967.
80. The Seventh Circuit considered intervention in three cases not discussed in the text. In
Preston v. United States, 596 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit deferred to the district
court's exercise of discretion in denying a motion to intervene because it was not timely. In Pres-
ton, suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) on behalf of a class of inmates. The prison
guards' union moved to intervene several weeks after a preliminary injunction had been issued,
although the union had had full knowledge of the case and some guard members had substan-
tially participated to date. In Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit
disregarded the suggestion that "standing" requirements apply to intervenor-defendants, and
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the Seventh Circuit enlarged the scope of collusion which is sufficient
to provide intervention as of right to a person already represented
before the court by a party. In Central States, Southeast & Southwest
Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Old Security L!fe Insurance Co. ,81 the
trustees of a union employee benefit plan fund sued several defendants
to recover money allegedly misappropriated in an insurance fraud con-
spiracy. After commencement of the suit, the trustees were forced to
resign and were replaced by new trustees, who were substituted as
plaintiffs. Thereafter, the beneficiaries of the fund moved to intervene
as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), filing an
intervention complaint which asserted claims against both the former
and the present trustees, and brought a separate, but identical, action in
the same federal district court against all of the defendants and the
former and present trustees. 82 The beneficiaries sought intervention on
the grounds that the plaintiff trustees could not adequately represent
them because the former trustees were in collusion with some or all of
the defendants and the former trustees exercised some influence over
the present trustees. Both plaintiffs and defendants opposed interven-
tion, arguing that direct collusion between the plaintiff and a defendant
had not been shown. The district court denied intervention. 83
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision as a mat-
ter of law and reversed the denial of the motion to intervene. 84 Ac-
cepting as true all of the non-conclusory, non-frivolous allegations in
support of the motion to intervene, 5 the court found "prima facie, a
case of collusion between the former trustees and the defendants, and a
relationship the equal of collusion between the present and former
trustees. '8 6 According to the Seventh Circuit, indirect collusion such as
this was sufficient to make representation inadequate and require inter-
vention. The court further noted that, contrary to the suggestion of the
district court, the existence of the beneficiaries' separate, concurrent ac-
tion in the same court does not bar intervention.8 7
stated that the only proper inquiry is whether the district court abused its discretion under FED. R.
Civ. P. 24 in allowing intervention. In Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979), the Sev-
enth Circuit held that intervention, unless expressly limited, includes the right to question and, if
necessary, to appeal from a consent decree.
81. 600 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1979).
82. Carpenter v. Fitzsimmons, No. 78 C 1672 (N.D. Ill., filed May 1, 1978).
83. Id.
84. 600 F.2d at 679 n.15.
85. Id at 679.
86. Id at 680.
87. Id. at 681.
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Class Actions
Several of the class action cases 88 which came before the Seventh
Circuit this year presented procedural problems. On two occasions, the
problem was whether a class action became moot when, before certifi-
cation of the class, the claim of the named plaintiff ceased to exist. In
response, the court adopted a new exception to the mootness doctrine.
In Susman v. Lincoln American Corp. ," the defendants, prior to
certification of the class, tendered the named plaintiff the full amount
of his individual claim plus costs in an effort to moot the entire action.
The district court dismissed the entire action. On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit reversed. The court acknowledged the general rule that if the
named plaintiffs claim is mooted prior to certification then the entire
class action is moot. 90 However, drawing on the reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court in Sosna v. Iowa,9 1 the court in Susman
held that necessity compels that such a tender not be allowed to moot
the entire class action "if the class action device is to work."'92 Instead,
if the plaintiff class is diligently pursuing certification, the Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that the district court first should rule on certification
and then should consider the effect, if any,93 of the tender to the named
plaintiff.
Subsequently, in DeBrown v. Trainor,94 plaintiff beneficiaries of
federal food stamp, Medicaid, and other assistance programs, claimed
that they suffered periodic, temporary gaps in eligibility whenever their
household status changed, although the change was from one eligible
status to another. At the time they commenced suit, the named plain-
88. The Seventh Circuit considered procedural class action problems in two other cases. In
In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979), the
most complex case, the court held, with great trepidation, that the district court erred in approving
a subclass settlement because subclass members were inadequately represented at the negotiations
and because the settlement unjustifiably prejudiced the rights of subclass members. In Brown v.
Scott, 602 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit was presented with defendants' argument
that class certification required an additional showing of "need" for the class device, when one of
the causes of action is a challenge to the constitutionality of a law on its face. The court acknowl-
edged case law which required "need" when a facial constitutional challenge was the sole cause of
action, as well as case law not requiring "need." The Seventh Circuit held that without question-
ing the soundness of defendant's suggestion, in this case, where a challenge was made to the
ordinance both on its face and as applied, no showing of "need" was required. Id. at 795.
89. 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978).
90. Id at 869, citing and limiting Winokur v. Bell Fed. Say. & Loan, 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.
1977).
91. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
92. 587 F.2d at 870.
93. For instance, a substitution of the named party may be required for lack of ability to
fairly and adequately represent the class. Id
94. 598 F.2d 1069 (7th Cir. 1979).
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tiffs were suffering from such a gap; however, shortly thereafter they
were declared eligible and were granted benefits retroactively. The dis-
trict court dismissed the action for mootness.
Upon review, the Seventh Circuit found that although the named
plaintiffs' claims had been mooted by a change of circumstances, the
claim was "capable of repetition yet evading review,"95 and allowed the
class action to continue. The court added that the newly announced
Susman96 exception also might have been applicable. 97 It is notewor-
thy that in DeBrown, the Seventh Circuit made no explicit finding, as it
did in Susman, that the defendants purposefully attempted to moot the
lawsuit. Thus, to the extent DeBrown is read not to contain such pur-
posefulness, the court's reference to Susman has the effect of expanding
the Susman exception.
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Several cases were decided by the Seventh Circuit during 1978-79
which presented interesting and diverse issues involving res judicata
and collateral estoppel. In particular, these cases discussed the kind of
prior proceeding which may invoke the operation of res judicata and
the latter's interaction with the various Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.
Res Judicata
In Martino v. McDonald's System, Inc.,98 the McDonald's system
brought an action for breach of contract against Martino, his franchise
corporation and his brothers, all of whom were owners of a single Mc-
Donald's franchise, when Martino's son began to operate a nearby
competing fast food restaurant. McDonald's alleged that this was a vi-
olation of a clause in the McDonald's franchise agreement requiring
that no family member compete with the franchisee. Before defendants
filed an answer, the parties reached a settlement. The district court ap-
proved the settlement and entered a consent decree, findings of fact and
95. Id at 1071.
96. 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978).
97. 598 F.2d at 1072.
98. Id. at 1079 (7th Cir. 1979). Other Seventh Circuit cases involving res judicata were Cal-
vert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1229, 1236 n.18 (7th Cir. 1979); Chicago-
Midwest Meat Ass'n v. City of Evanston, 589 F.2d 278, 281 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978) (effect of action
brought by an association on subsequent actions by individual members); Kurek v. Pleasure
Driveway & Park Dist., 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978) (state court proceedings not res judicata on
federal action brought under exclusive federal jurisdiction); Gilbert v. Braniff Int'l Corp., 579 F.2d
411 (7th Cir. 1978) (non-"final" judgment cannot operate as res judicata).
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conclusions of law, pursuant to which Martino sold his franchise back
to McDonald's. Several years later, Martino and his franchise corpora-
tion brought this action against McDonald's alleging that enforcement
of the "no family competition" clause violated the antitrust laws.
Plaintiffs claimed damages for being forced to sell the franchise at a
low price and for the business profits which would have been realized if
Martino had not been forced to sell the franchise. Defendants argued
that the new suit was barred by either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
13(a) 99 or res judicata.
The Seventh Circuit held that the action was barred by res judi-
cata, notwithstanding special treatment often accorded antitrust claims,
principally because allowing the action would force inconsistent obliga-
tions on the defendants. Rule 13 was held not applicable because Mar-
tino did not make a responsive pleading in the first suit. Thus, the
court avoided plaintiffs' argument that despite the strictness of rule
13(a), antitrust counterclaims are permissive'0° rather than compulsory,
and consequently, if not pleaded they are not barred in a subsequent
suit by rule 13.
With respect to general principles of res j udicata, the Seventh Cir-
cuit acknowledged that where a single matter can constitute both an
affirmative defense and a distinct affirmative cause of action, the af-
firmative cause of action will not be barred by the failure to raise the
affirmative defense in an earlier suit. However, the court explained
that this general principle does not operate if it would unfairly subject
the defendant to inconsistent obligations, as it would if the second suit
undercuts the validity of the first judgment. The court found this case
presented such a situation because Martino's second action was based
on the very conduct sanctioned by the court at the end of the first ac-
tion and relied on by McDonald's ever since. Res judicata therefore
barred the second action.
In Chicago Sheraton Corp. v. Zaban,10 plaintiff brought an action
in state court challenging a state tax collection procedure for, among
other things, violating federal due process. The state trial court dis-
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which
at the time of serving the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction.
100. 598 F.2d at 1082 n.3, citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661
(1944).
101. 593 F.2d 808 (7th Cir. 1979).
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missed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The trial court's dis-
missal was affirmed on appeal up to and including the state supreme
court. Plaintiff then brought a section 1983102 action in federal court
based on the same due process theory. The district court decided the
action was barred by res judicata on the state action and dismissed.
The plaintiff then appealed to the Seventh Circuit. While on appeal to
the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff appealed the state supreme court deci-
sion to the United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a substantial federal question. 0 3
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court, albeit based on dif-
ferent reasoning. Contrary to the district court, the Seventh Circuit
held that prior final state court proceedings do not operate as a bar to
subsequent section 1983 suits in federal court; only prior federal suits
do so.' 04 However, the court of appeals then held that the summary
disposition for want of substantial federal question of the appeal from
the state supreme court to the United States Supreme Court constituted
a sufficient federal proceeding to act as a bar, since it is a review of the
merits of the action. 0 5 Accordingly, the district court's dismissal was
erroneous at the time it was ordered since there had not yet been an
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Because such an appeal
occurred before the court decided the case on appeal, the claim was
barred by the prior federal adjudication and dismissal was affirmed.
In Merit Insurance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co. ,106 defendants
challenged plaintiffs ability to voluntarily dismiss its contract action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) 10 7 and argued that
102. Section 1983 provides:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
103. 439 U.S. 888, reh. denied, 439 U.S. 998 (1979).
104. 593 F.2d at 809, citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 509 n.14 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). This appears to be incorrect, however, at least in the Seventh Circuit. See Reich v.
City of Freeport, 527 F.2d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 1975); Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir.
1963). See also 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, at § 3573 n.51.
105. 593 F.2d at 809. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332 (1975).
106. 581 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1978).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 provides in part:
Voluntary Dismissal: effect thereof.
By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and
of any statute of the United States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without
order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii)
by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.
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under rule 41(a)(2) court approval was necessary for dismissal.
Without filing either an answer or a motion for summary judgment, the
defendants successfully moved for a stay and an order compelling arbi-
tration on the basis of an express provision in the contract in suit. De-
fendants argued, however, that while the letter of rule 41(a)(2)
requiring a responsive pleading had not been met, the issues in effect
had been joined and to allow voluntary dismissal would be inequitable.
The Seventh Circuit, over a dissent, construed rule 41(a)(1) strictly, re-
stricted the equitable exceptions thereto, and affirmed the district
court's order allowing voluntary dismissal. The court of appeals found
that the issues were not joined by defendants' motion and order and,
while considerable discovery had occurred, the efforts expended
thereby could be fully utilized in the arbitration proceedings.
The dissent argued that by allowing voluntary dismissal under rule
41(a)(1) the plaintiff, having once lost on the merits of the issue of
whether arbitration was compelled by the contract, could try the same
issue again without prejudice. 10 8 Rather, the dissent proposed to treat
the defendants' motion for stay as one for summary judgment on the
issue of arbitration. 10 9 Another solution to the problem posed by the
dissent is suggested by Martino.10 In that case, the Seventh Circuit
allowed a proceeding which resulted in a consent decree to bar a subse-
quent suit, where rule 13(a) would not bar a subsequent suit, because
the required responsive pleading was absent. In Merit Insurance, while
the responsive pleading required by rule 41(a) was absent, the general
principles of collateral estoppel might bar a future suit on arbitrability
brought by the plaintiff since there would have been an adjudication of
the claim on the merits with a full opportunity for the plaintiff to par-
ticipate.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits
when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of
any state an action based on or including the same claim.
By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this
rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim
has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
108. 581 F.2d at 144 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
109. If the contract was submitted to the court and if the motion was phrased as one to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, rule 12(b) would require the result suggested by the dissent, namely
that the motion be treated as one for summary judgment.
110. 598 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1979).
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In Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology,"' Cohen brought an
action under section 1983' 12 against her employer, the Illinois Institute
of Technology. The defendant answered and moved to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a cause of action. This motion was granted by the district
court and affirmed on appeal without mention of the possibility that
plaintiff might amend, and without directions to the district court to
consider proposed amendments on remand. Cohen apparently wished
to continue to press her claim. She was barred from beginning a new
action, however, by the res judicata effect of the dismissal, unless she
obtained relief from that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b).1 3 The plaintiff failed to amend under rule 15(a), 114 but did
have her appeal heard, albeit after an extended, confused litigation."l5
The Seventh Circuit held that Cohen was not absolutely barred
from amending and that she could bring a motion for leave to amend
111. 581 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1978).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). For the text of section 1983, see note 102 supra.
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides:
Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (I)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judg-
ment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceed-
ing was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding,
or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28,
U.S.C. § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis,
coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review,
are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides:
Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no respon-
sive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an
amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the
longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
115. In Cohen, plaintiff first directed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint to the
Seventh Circuit, which denied jurisdiction, then directed it to the district court, which also denied
jurisdiction. Plaintiff next petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to force the
district court to assume jurisdiction over her motion and decide the merits. The court granted the
writ, the district court assumed jurisdiction and denied the motion. Plaintiffs appeal of this order
denying the motion was before the court and denied in this case.
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her complaint even though a final determination had been made.
However, since the determination had been affirmed on appeal, the de-
cision whether to allow leave was in the sound discretion of the court of
appeals." 6 In the Seventh Circuit, the court stated, the practice is for
the district court on remand to in fact consider the motion to amend. " 7
The court further stated that while Cohen did not do this on the previ-
ous appeal, Cohen's instant petition for a writ of mandamus accom-
plished the same end. The Seventh Circuit further stated that while it
may have been more proper for Cohen to seek relief from the final
judgment directly under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the
writ of mandamus in effect vacated the district court's earlier judgment.
The result of this accommodation, however, appears to be that
should a plaintiff fail to ask for or receive a direction from the court of
appeals to the district court to consider an amended complaint, plain-
tiff's relief lies in a writ of mandamus to the court of appeals and not a
motion to either the district court or the court of appeals. While the
district court could vacate the judgment under rule 60(b), it could not
itself grant leave to amend under rule 15(a) without direction from the
court of appeals to do so, since the matter had been before the appeals
court and its discretion was required for leave to amend. The result is a
clumsy procedure at best.
Finally, in Himmel v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust
Co. , 118 the Seventh Circuit discussed the operation of res j udicata not
only as to matters which in fact were litigated, but also as to matters
which might have been litigated but were not. Plaintiffs, beneficiaries
of a trust, sued the trustee for mismanagement. Several years earlier,
the plaintiffs had brought an action against the trustee to revise the
terms of the trust so as to allow the trustees to make investments yield-
ing higher rates of return. In this subsequent action, the district court
granted the trustee's motion for partial summary judgment on claims
arising from conduct which occurred prior to the entry of judgment in
the earlier action on the ground that they were barred by res judicata.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the present action would
be barred only if it was premised on the same cause of action, that is, if
the same facts gave rise to both actions, or if plaintiffs in the exercise of
due diligence might have brought the present cause of action in the
earlier suit. 19 Over a dissent, the court found that the second action
116. 581 F.2d at 662.
117. Id., citing Asher v. Harrington, 461 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1972).
118. 596 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979).
119. Id at 210, citing Bratchett v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 519 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1975).
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arose out of different facts than the first. The Seventh Circuit then de-
termined that, at the very least, there was a question of material fact
concerning whether at the time of the first action the plaintiffs knew or
should have known the facts which gave rise to the second action.
Given this fact question, summary judgment was inappropriate. 20
Collateral Estoppel
In the one case of note involving collateral estoppel, Continental
Can Co. v. Marshall,'2' the Seventh Circuit thoroughly discussed the
operation of collateral estoppel in the setting of administrative agency
adjudicative proceedings. Continental Can was a manufacturer whose
eighty separate plants were probable targets of an OSHA 22 adminis-
trative proceeding to enforce noise level regulations. Continental Can
successfully defended the performance of its plant in the first such pro-
ceeding and attempted to bar proceedings against its other plants on
the basis that the facts and issues were essentially the same at all its
plants, that the agency had tried and lost one proceeding and that it
ought to be collaterally estopped from trying again. When the admin-
istrative law judge refused to bar further proceedings, Continental Can
brought an action in district court for a declaration that collateral es-
toppel should apply to bar further administrative enforcement proceed-
ings and for an injunction prohibiting the agency from initiating such
proceedings.
The Seventh Circuit thoroughly explained and applied the re-
quirements of the doctrine of collateral estoppel,12 3 and held that fur-
ther proceedings were barred thereby. More interesting, however, was
the manner whereby the court found jurisdiction to hear the action and
give injunctive and declaratory relief. The court held that the failure of
the administrative law judge to allow the operation of collateral estop-
pel to bar the many threatened similar proceedings allowed the agency
to so harass the plaintiff as to violate plaintiffs due process rights and
subject the agency action to the jurisdiction of the courts. 124
120. 596 F.2d at 210-11. It is interesting to note that the court rejected defendants' invitation
to invoke judicial estoppel, noting that its very existence in the Seventh Circuit is uncertain. The
court went on to find that the principle was inapplicable in this case in any event, since the facts
were not the same in the two suits and since plaintiffs' positions were not necessarily inconsistent.
121. 603 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1979). Continental Can Co. is hereafter referred to as Continental
Can.
122. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b)(l) (1978).
123. 603 F.2d at 594-96.
124. Id. at 597.
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PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The 1978-79 term was marked by the Seventh Circuit's first inter-
pretations of the "new" jurisdiction as set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heftner125 and Kulko v. Superior Court. 26
In four cases, the Seventh Circuit discussed the constitutional require-
ments for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. In two
of three cases where the Seventh Circuit had diversity jurisdiction, 127
the court found personal jurisdiction lacking and dismissed the action,
even though in one case substantial proceedings had been conducted
which had resulted in a summary judgment for the plaintiff. 128 In the
fourth case, where jurisdiction was based on a federal statute which
authorized nationwide service of process, the court clarified the point at
which the due process question involved in the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction must be considered. 29
In Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction
Co. ,130 the court rendered its fullest discussion of the current law of
jurisdictional due process. The court determined from Shaffer that the
relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation is at the
heart of the inquiry. It disposed of the United States Supreme Court
decision in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 13 as limited to its
facts because of the presence of a strong state interest, and embraced
the "purposefully availed" test 32 first set forth in Hanson v. Denckla133
and later in Shaffer. Finding this test not met, the district court's as-
sumption ofjurisdiction was reversed. The summary judgment entered
in favor of the plaintiff was vacated and the district court was ordered
to either dismiss the case or transfer it to another district in which it
might have been brought.
Lakeside Bridge was a diversity action on a contract for the sale of
goods from plaintiff, a Wisconsin corporation, to defendant, a West
Virginia corporation, for use in a third state. Although the contract
neither required nor specified where the goods would be manufactured,
the plaintiff manufactured the goods in Wisconsin and contended on
125. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
126. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
127. People v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v.
Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979); Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Marshall County
Hosp., 586 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1978).
128. Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979).
129. Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979).
130. 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979).
131. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
132. 597 F.2d at 600-01.
133. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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appeal that this should have been expected. Plaintiff initiated the sale
outside of Wisconsin. However, the contract was executed by the
plaintiff mailing an offer from Wisconsin and the defendant sending a
purchase order to Wisconsin. Furthermore, while the contract was be-
ing performed the plaintiff, in Wisconsin, and the defendant, out of
state, corresponded with and telephoned one another. These were the
defendant's only business dealings with Wisconsin.
The Seventh Circuit reasoned in Lakeside Bridge that while it may
have been likely that plaintiff would manufacture the goods within
Wisconsin, defendant did not intend it. Absent such intent, whether
the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
business within Wisconsin, and thus whether the district court can con-
stitutionally exercise jurisdiction, depends on an inquiry into the nature
and quality of the effects of defendant's acts, the relationship between
the state, the plaintiff and the defendant, and the inconvenience of the
forum to the defendant. 13 4 According to the Seventh Circuit, where the
defendant's acts are not highly dangerous, jurisdiction further depends
on the defendant's other relationships with the state.' 35 The court
found that in this commercial contract case, the effects of defendant's
acts were not highly dangerous, and that the cause of action arose only
in part from such acts within the state. The court stated that the for-
malities of contract execution are not determinative of personal juris-
diction and that the defendants' ability to affirmatively use the forum
state's court to sue the plaintiff does not constitute a meaningful rela-
tionship for the purpose of determining jurisdiction. Moreover, the
court cautioned against burdening the interstate and international com-
mercial systems by inconveniencing defendants through allowing juris-
diction in such commercial cases.
In Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Marshall County Hospital,36 the Seventh
Circuit affirmed and adopted the decision of an Illinois district court
that it would be unreasonable and violative of due process to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a Mississippi hospital in a diversity action for
breach of a lease agreement. The decision in Telco Leasing focused on
the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation,
rather than mechanical or quantitative evaluations of the defendant's
contacts with the forum, in a manner consistent with the analysis in
Lakeside Bridge.
134. 597 F.2d at 603-04.
135. Id. at 602 & 602 n. 11.
136. 586 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1978).
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In Telco Leasing, defendant, a Mississippi hospital, began negotia-
tions with out-of-state manufacturers for equipment to be shipped from
the manufacturers to the hospital. However, these manufacturers in
turn solicited leasing services from the plaintiff leasing company
through its out-of-state agent. The agent mailed forms directly to the
hospital which were completed and returned by the hospital to the
agent. The agent forwarded these, as well as an initial payment made
by the hospital to the agent, to the plaintiff in Illinois. Later, the hospi-
tal caused signed copies of equipment acceptances, purchase orders,
and rental payments to be sent directly to the plaintiff in Illinois, and
over an extended period of time the hospital's agents and counsel wrote
and telephoned plaintiff in Illinois.
The district court found that the hospital did not initiate the trans-
action which led to the Illinois contract and that the hospital was not
involved in substantial ongoing activity in Illinois, since its agents
never visited the state or contacted the state again. The Seventh Circuit
disregarded the provisions of the lease agreement itself, which provided
that it became binding when accepted by the lessor in Illinois and fur-
ther provided that the law of Illinois would apply. In effect, the out-of-
state independent agent buffered most of the contacts between the hos-
pital and the forum state.
In Wisconsin v. City of Milwaukee, 3 7 the states of Illinois and
Michigan brought an action under the federal common law of nuisance
against the City of Milwaukee for polluting the waters of Lake Michi-
gan within their state boundaries. Although the basis of jurisdiction
was federal question rather than diversity, since there was no applica-
ble nationwide service of process statute, jurisdiction was limited under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) 138 by the long arm statute of the
forum state and, of course, due process. The Seventh Circuit found
137. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provides:
Same: Service upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State. Whenever a
statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service of a
summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabit-
ant of or found within the state in which the district court is held, service may be made
under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or order, or, if there
is no provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated in this rule.
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides
(1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a
party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to
him to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or gar-
nishment or similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either
case be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or
rule.
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that the Illinois long arm statute 39 was satisfied because Milwaukee's
tortious acts occurred within Illinois, since the injury occurred there.
The court then found that due process was also satisfied because of the
magnitude of Milwaukee's sewage disposal and the substantial threat
of harm to Illinois residents which resulted therefrom.
In Fitzsimmons v. Barton,140 however, the Seventh Circuit fol-
lowed a very different analysis because of the presence of a nationwide
service of process statute. In Fitzsimmons, the district court had dis-
missed a defendant in a federal securities fraud action for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction under the state long arm statute and the due process
clause. The Seventh Circuit reversed, explaining that the state long
arm statute and the standard due process analysis simply are not appli-
cable to federal question actions where nationwide service of process is
authorized.' 4' Resort to the state statutes for manner of service was
erroneous on the face of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) since
there was a federal securities statute 42 providing for nationwide service
of process. The only jurisdictional question posed, according to the
Seventh Circuit, was "whether the Due Process Clause imposes any
restraints on this nationwide service." 43 The court held that it does not
and allowed jurisdiction under the reasoning that due process "fair-
ness" relates to the fairness of the exercise of power by a particular
sovereign. In a federal question case, the sovereign is the United States
and, thus, the defendant's contacts must be considered in relation to the
country as a whole, not to any one forum within it. '44 Since residence
of the defendant in the sovereign alone is sufficient to make jurisdiction
fair, 145 jurisdiction over the defendant, a resident of the United States,
was fair in this case.
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1977).
140. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
141. See id. at 333 n.2. Cf. Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke Co., 509 F.2d 1137 (7th
Cir. 1975) (no nationwide service of process statute). By so deciding, the court made one of the
few clear articulations in the case law of this aspect ofjurisdiction. See also Mariash v. Morrill,
496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972); Gemini Enterprises Corp v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559,
563 (M.D.N.C. 1979); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 358 (W.D. Mich. 1973); First
Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and
regulations thereunder, . . . may be brought in any such district [wherein any act or
transaction constituting the violation occurred] or in the district wherein the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served
in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant
may be found.
143. 589 F.2d at 332.
144. Id. at 333.
145. Id.
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The court in Fitzsimmons, however, emphasized the important role
played by the state's interests in the defendant's contacts and activities,
noting that in Shaffer the United States Supreme Court had "carefully
delineated and discussed the various state interests which arose from
the contacts present and considered whether the interests could fairly
justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.' 46
This discussion of due process was unnecessary to the decision in Fitz-
simmons and unfortunately was at odds with Lakeside Bridge, where
the purposefully availed strain of the analysis was emphasized.
Finally, the court of appeals in Fitzsimmons acknowledged that
even when the district court sits as a federal court and there is a nation-
wide service of process authorization, the defendant's relationship with
a particular forum within the sovereign still may present problems. 47
Indeed, the problems may rise to constitutional dimensions. 48 None-
theless, these problems are the proper concern of forum non conveniens
or venue, not jurisdiction. 49
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Several cases in 1978-79 presented to the Seventh Circuit the task
of monitoring the flow of issues to the appellate level by articulating
and applying standards of finality and procedures for securing appel-
late review, and by setting the standards to be used in reviewing the
various issues which come before the court of appeals. In many in-
stances, the court considered its own jurisdiction under sections 1291' 50
and 1292'15 to hear the matter sought to be appealed. In several of
146. Id. at 332.
147. Id. at 334.
148. Id. at 334 n.5.
149. Id. at 334-35. The court also considered venue in Donnelley Corp. v. FTC, 580 F.2d 264
(7th Cir. 1978).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides in part:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States, .... except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (i) Interlocutory or-
ders of the district courts of the United States, . . . or of the judges thereof, granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or mod-
ify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court; ...
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may there-
upon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is
made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That applica-
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these cases, 15 2 the court examined jurisdiction on its own motion, thus
re-emphasizing the fundamental rule that parties cannot confer, or
waive objections to, subject matter jurisdiction. 53 While the court
noted in these cases that the United States Supreme Court has taken an
"intensely practical" approach to deciding whether judgments are ap-
pealable,' 54 the Seventh Circuit also cautioned that exceptions to the
statutory scheme such as the Cohen doctrine 155 would be strictly ap-
plied, and alternate procedures such as a Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 54(b) order 156 would be strictly enforced.
In In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation,157 the
Seventh Circuit was presented with an order of the district court ap-
proving a class action settlement for the claims of one of two sub-
classes. The district court had refused the motion of dissatisfied mem-
bers of the subclass to enter judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b).' 58 Thus, the subclass members were forced to appeal
the order as collateral. The court set forth at length the four traditional
requirements of the "collateral" order exception:159 (1) the order must
have been finally determined in the sense that although further consid-
eration by the district court is possible, it is unlikely; (2) the order must
be separable from the merits; (3) rights of the appellant would be irre-
trievably lost if review were delayed; and, (4) review of the order must
present important and unresolved legal questions.
The court first found that the order in effect was final since the
tion for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
152. U.S. Gen., Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 1979); In re General Mo-
tors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106, 1117 (7th Cir. 1979).
153. 594 F.2d at 1117, citing Levin v. Baum, 513 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1975).
154. 594 F.2d at 1118, citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.ll (1976).
155. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen, the United States
Supreme Court held that an order may be appealable where it is "a final disposition of a claimed
right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it."
Id. at 546-47.
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides:
Judgment upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties only
upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry ofjudgment. In the absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
157. 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979).
158. See note 156 supra.
159. 594 F.2d at 1118-21.
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district court had conducted an extensive fairness hearing and twice
had refused to reconsider the order. Although the district court re-
tained jurisdiction, it did so merely to complete the ministerial task of
implementing the settlement. That the order was sufficiently separate
to satisfy the second requirement was not as clear to the court. The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that to properly review the fairness of the
sub-class settlement, the court must in effect review the merits of the
underlying cause of action. Separateness, however, in the sense "a se-
manticist might expect" is not required.
The court further found that upon review an appellate court does
not reach the real merits of the cause of action, but rather decides only
whether the district court abused its discretion when it considered the
merits of the case as part of its evaluation of the appropriateness of the
entire settlement. The third requirement was satisfied, according to the
Seventh Circuit, because the appellants would suffer an irretrievable
loss of rights if forced to delay their appeal until the conclusion of the
rest of the suit. Such a delay might last several years, by which time
review would be ineffective. Finally, the court found that striking the
proper balance between encouraging settlements and ensuring fairness
to class action litigants was a sufficiently important question of law to
allow the appeal.
In American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Grady,160 the Seventh
Circuit found that the "collateral order" exception was satisfied by an
order entered by the district court in the case MCI Communications
Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 161 The order granted the
motion of the government, a non-party, to modify a protective order in
force between the parties and to require MCI to make available to the
government information which it obtained in discovery from AT&T
for use in a pending government case against AT&T.
While acknowledging that the Cohen rule generally is inapplicable
to discovery orders,162 the Seventh Circuit held it was applicable in this
case because the petitioner did not have the other usual options to chal-
160. 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. MCI
Commun. Corp., 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
161. 462 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D.IIl. 1978). American Telephone & Telegraph is hereinafter re-
ferred to as AT&T.
162. 594 F.2d at 596, citing Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121 (1906). Compare the
Seventh Circuit's refusal to hear a discovery order in the class action in Judd v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 599 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1979). In Judd, the plaintiffs appealed an order of the district
court denying them the use of defendants' computer lists to identify class members in a less expen-
sive manner. The Seventh Circuit held that the order was unreviewable under Cohen since it did
not present either an important issue or an irretrievable burden on the plaintiffs. Id. at 822. Ac-
cording to the court, if eventual review were to conclude that plaintiffs should have had use of the
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lenge the order, and because delay would cause an irretrievable loss of
rights. Normally, an order allowing discovery can be challenged by
refusing to produce or testify, being cited for criminal contempt and
then appealing that order. While possibly quite costly, this option at
least allows separate and expedited review of the discovery order with-
out divulging the contested information. However, in this case AT&T
could not prevent the release of the information ordered by the district
court because the information already was in the possession of MCI
which had been ordered to release it to the government.
In the other cases decided by the Seventh Circuit, however, the
court discussed the requirements of Cohen in terms so strict that much
of the discussion in In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Liti-
gation 163 is misleading at best, and then refused to hear the appeals.
Perhaps the best example is Central States, Southeast & South west Areas
Health & Welfare Fund v. Old Security Lfe Insurance Co. 164 In this
case, the Seventh Circuit refused to review an interlocutory order in
which the district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint and to abstain because of an injunction entered in a pending
state suit. The court found that the order failed to satisfy two require-
ments of Cohen, which it interpreted quite strictly: the order did not
present an unsettled question of law and it did not cause the defendant
an irretrievable loss of rights.
According to the Seventh Circuit, the question of law presented by
the order was merely whether the district court abused its discretion by
refusing to abstain because previously a state court had enjoined plain-
tiff from bringing further suits of any kind in any forum. Yet, the court
stated that the settled law is that abstention probably would have been
an abuse of discretion since the complaint alleged a claim over which
the district court has exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, where the ques-
tion presented by the order is merely whether the district court properly
exercised its discretion, the order rarely will be subject to review under
Cohen. The exercise of discretion can hardly be considered an unset-
tled question of law, nor has the appellant lost much of a right when
the district court has decided adversely to him in its discretion.
The conflict with In re General Motors165 is obvious. In Central
computer lists, they could recover from the defendants the additional expense incurred because of
the erroneous ruling. Id. at 822-23.
163. 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979).
164. 600 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1979).
165. See note 157 supra and accompanying discussion in text.
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States Fund,166 the fact that the question presented by the order was
the review of discretion of the district court defeated appealability un-
der Cohen. The same result did not obtain in In re General Motors
although this was the sole question. Moreover, the legal questions in
the two cases seem equally important and equally settled, although the
court found this was not so.
Finally, the court's treatment of the appellant's loss was problem-
atic. The appellant's loss of right-to be forced to defend itself in the
federal forum-was not viewed by the court as irretrievable or different
from the harm present in the denial of every motion to dismiss. None-
theless, it is difficult to distinguish this harm from that in Cohen as
readily as did the Seventh Circuit. In Cohen, the district court held that
a state statute requiring plaintiffs to post a security bond for defend-
ant's costs and attorneys fees did not apply in a diversity action in fed-
eral court, and dismissed the defendant's motion for a bond. The court
heard defendant's appeal of that order in part because the defendants
would experience irretrievable harm if forced to undertake litigation
without the assurance provided by the bond that they would be reim-
bursed their costs and fees if they ultimately triumphed. Thus, in Co-
hen, as in Central States Fund, the harm at issue was that of being
forced to bear the costs of litigation. Further, the harm in Cohen really
was less; the appellant had a chance to recover full costs should the
district court's decision on the bond requirement be reversed. In Cen-
tral States Fund, the appellant had no hope of recovering costs or fees
from the opposing party.
The Seventh Circuit also decided several cases concerning its ap-
pellate jurisdiction under rule 54(b) 167 and sections 1291 and
1292(a)(1).' 68 In U.S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet,169 the court put
bench and bar on notice that the practice of certification under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) will never be the same in the Seventh
Circuit. In that case, after examining the certification on its own mo-
tion and finding it deficient, the court independently determined that
certification was not improper in the case and heard the appeal. How-
ever, the court flatly warned that future rule 54(b) certifications with
similar deficiencies may not be expected to survive in the Seventh Cir-
cuit. 70 The court explained: "A proper exercise of the trial court's
166. See note 81 supra and accompanying discussion in text.
167. See note 156 supra.
168. See notes 150-51 supra.
169. 598 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1979).
170. Id. at 1051 n.1.
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discretion under Rule 54(b) also requires more than a recital of the
statutory formula. The considerations underlying the exercise of that
discretion should be articulated."' 17 1 Furthermore, the order must ex-
pressly direct entry of judgment and judgment must be obtained in ac-
cordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.172
With respect to section 1291173 appeals of final orders, in
Sportmart, Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. 174 the Seventh Circuit
assumed jurisdiction of an appeal from a denial of a motion for civil
contempt for violation of a consent decree, noting that while orders
denying contempt motions usually are non-final, most post-judgment
orders are final under section 1291.175 The court held that the consent
decree operated as a final judgment for purposes of section 1291, and
since the district court had completely disposed of the matter, the order
was final and appealable.
Finally, in two cases the court of appeals considered whether an
interlocutory order involved injunctive relief so as to make it appeala-
ble under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1). 176 In Barrett v. Grand Trunk Western
Railroad,77 a railroad employee brought an action to obtain proper
seniority and back pay on account of his service in the armed forces.
171. Id.
172. d. FED. R. Civ. P. 58 provides:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b):
(1) upon a general verdict of a jury, or upon a decision by the court that a party
shall recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be denied, the clerk, unless
the court otherwise orders, shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment without
awaiting any direction by the court;
(2) upon a decision by the court granting other relief, or upon a special verdict or a
general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, the court shall promptly ap-
prove the form of the judgment, and the clerk shall thereupon enter it. Every judgment
shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment is effective only when so set forth
and when entered as provided in Rule 79(a). Entry of the judgment shall not be delayed
for the taxing of costs. Attorneys shall not submit forms ofjudgment except upon direc-
tion of the court, and these directions shall not be given as a matter of course.
Compare Licek Potato Chip Co. v. Fair, 599 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1979), where the court also strictly
enforced the rule 54(b) standards. In this case, the Seventh Circuit denied review of an order of
the district court affirming an order of a bankruptcy judge dismissing a third-party complaint in a
bankruptcy proceeding for want of jurisdiction. After considering special statutory provisions
relating to the court's appellate jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters, the court found that the order
dismissing the third-party complaint was a classic example of an interlocutory, non-final order.
Virtually the only way to review such an order, the Seventh Circuit stated, was for the district
court to determine that under rule 54(b) the order is final. However, the court dismissed appel-
lant's arguments that the district court intended to and substantially did comply with rule 54(b)
and refused the appeal. However, it was noted that appellants still could move the district court
for such a determination.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). See note 150 supra.
174. 601 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1979).
175. Id. at 315-16. For text of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976), see note 150 supra.
176. See note 150 supra.
177. 581 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1978).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Defendant railroad appealed from an order granting plaintiff partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability, ordering the parties to pro-
ceed with the damage case and ordering the defendant to adjust its
records to reflect the earlier seniority date for the plaintiff. The Sev-
enth Circuit held that the portion of the order expressly mandating the
defendant to adjust Barrett's employment records was an injunction
and brought the entire order within section 1292(a)(1). In United States
v. American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, 78 however, the court
dismissed for want of jurisdiction an appeal from an order approving a
proposed settlement between the United States and one of the defend-
ant associations and denying an intervenor's petition to restrain the as-
sociation from entering into the settlement. The Seventh Circuit held
that opposition to a proposed settlement, even if characterized as re-
questing an injunction against settling, does not involve an injunction
within the meaning of section 1292(a)(1). 179
178. 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978).
179. Other civil procedure cases decided by the Seventh Circuit during 1978-79 are set forth
below.
PLEADING: Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (strict pleading test for 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) conspiracy action); Verhein v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 598 F.2d 1061 (7th
Cir. 1979) (denial of motion for leave to amend complaint; complaint proper where amended
allegations insufficient); Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978) (stan-
dards for summary judgment under rule 56); Sassi v. Breier, 584 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979) (relation back of amendment to complaint under rule 15(c)): Lamb's
Patio Theatre, Inc. v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 582 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1978) (refusal of
summary judgment under rule 56(f) pending further discovery properly denied).
DISCOVERY: Margoles v. Johns, 587 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1978) (standard of review under rule
60(b) of dismissal of complaint under rule 37(b)(2) for plaintiffs willful failure to comply with
discovery order); Mertens v. Hummell, 587 F.2d 862 (7th Cir. 1978) (rule 37(b) dismissal for fail-
ure to comply with pretrial discovery orders); First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin
Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (availability of work product of previous counsel disqualified
for conflict of interest).
DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL: Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium, A/S v. Baxter Trave-
nol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978).
INJUNCTIONS: Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979) (lesser showing
required for injunctive relief in favor of a sovereign); Bastian v. Lakefront Realty Corp., 581 F.2d
685 (7th Cir. 1978) (claim for injunction not moot where conduct sought to be enjoined occurs
before final review); Kolz v. Board of Educ., 576 F.2d 747 (7th Cir. 1978) (standard of review of
denial of preliminary injunction).
FEDERAL COURTS' RELATIONSHIP TO STATES: Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230 (7th Cir.
1978) (eleventh amendment bars a claim for direct benefits against non-independent state agency);
Mackey v. Stanton, 586 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 2,
1979) (No. 78-1733) (eleventh amendment does not bar an action for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976) against defendant county welfare department); Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Whitler, 585
F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1978) (Tax Injunction Act bars 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) action to enjoin collec-
tion of state taxes); Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) action against county for damages for
wrongful tax collection not barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976)).
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS: Nemkov v. O'Hare Chicago Corp., 592 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1979)
(where exclusive remedy in action on federal right is equitable, laches applies, not statute of limi-
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CONCLUSION
During the 1978-79 term, the Seventh Circuit decided many cases
involving civil procedure issues. This article has attempted to select for
discussion those cases which in most instances may make that critical
difference in the tug-of-war we call litigation.
tations); Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067 (7th Cir. 1978) (equitable estoppel bars
raising statute of limitations).
MAGISTRATES: United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W.
3217 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1979) (No. 79-8). In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert & Bennet Mfg. Co.,
589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1979).
OTHER: August v. Delta Air Lines, 600 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1979) (good faith requirement read
into rule 68 offer of judgment); Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc., 600
F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1979) (jury damage verdict did not reflect improper compromise on liability or
damages); SCA Services, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 599 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1979) (post-judgment
award of costs should include cost of copies of depositions); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v.
Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979) (timeliness of rule 50(b)
motion for directed verdict); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Local 627, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581
F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1978) (refusal of district court judge to disqualify himself under 28 U.S.C. §
455 (1976)).
